Assessing deprivation with an ordinal variable: theory and application to sanitation deprivation in Bangladesh by Seth, S & Yalonetzky, G
This is a repository copy of Assessing deprivation with an ordinal variable: theory and 
application to sanitation deprivation in Bangladesh.




Seth, S orcid.org/0000-0002-2591-6977 and Yalonetzky, G orcid.org/0000-0003-2438-
0223 (2020) Assessing deprivation with an ordinal variable: theory and application to 
sanitation deprivation in Bangladesh. The World Bank Economic Review. ISSN 0258-6770 
https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhz051
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK. This is an author 
produced version of a paper published in The World Bank Economic Review. Uploaded in 




Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Assessing deprivation with an ordinal variable: theory and
application to sanitation deprivation in Bangladesh
Suman Seth∗ Gaston Yalonetzky†
December 5, 2019
Abstract
The challenges associated with poverty measurement with a cardinal variable have received
due attention during the last four decades, but there is a dearth of literature studying how
to meaningfully assess poverty with an ordinal variable. In this paper, we first propose a
class of simple, intuitive and policy-relevant poverty measures for ordinal variables. Our
measures are sensitive to depth of deprivations, unlike the headcount ratio. Moreover, under
appropriate restrictions, our measures ensure that priority is given to the poorest among
the poor while targeting, monitoring and evaluating poverty alleviation programs. To as-
sess the robustness of poverty comparisons to alternative choices of parameters, we develop
various stochastic dominance tests (some of which are themselves novel contributions to the
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stochastic dominance literature). Our empirical illustration documenting changes in sanita-
tion deprivation in Bangladesh showcases our measures’ ability to identify instances in which
overall sanitation deprivation improved while leaving the poorest behind.
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1. Introduction
Around four decades ago, in an influential article titled ‘Poverty: An Ordinal Approach
to Measurement’, Nobel laureate Amartya Sen proposed an axiomatically derived poverty
measure to avoid some shortcomings of the traditionally used headcount ratio (Sen, 1976).
Sen’s approach was ordinal in the sense that his poverty measures assigned an ordinal-rank
weight to each poor person’s income, an otherwise cardinal variable. Since then, this seminal
article has influenced a well-developed literature on poverty measurement involving cardinal
variables within an axiomatic framework (Thon, 1979; Clark et al., 1981; Chakravarty, 1983;
Foster et al., 1984; Foster and Shorrocks, 1988a,b; Ravallion, 1994; Shorrocks, 1995).
Distances between the values of cardinally measurable variables are meaningful; whereas
ordinal variables merely consist of ordered categories. 1 When numeral scales are as-
signed to these categories according to their order, the implied cardinal distances are hard
to interpret. Moreover, poverty orderings are inconveniently sensitive to changes in the
choice of these scales. Let us consider a simple example with a five-category ordinal vari-
able, where the four worst categories reflect deprivations. Suppose the population distribu-
tions across the five ordered categories in two countries are A = (0.1, 0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2) and
B = (0.2, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4), respectively. If we use the numeral scales of (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) for the
1Based on the classification of measurement scales by Stevens (1946), whenever numeral scales are assigned
to different ordered categories of an ordinal variable according to the orders or ranks of these categories, any
‘order-preserving’ or monotonic transformation should leave the scale form invariant. See Roberts (1979)
for further in-depth discussions. In this paper, by ordinal variables we simply refer to variables with ordered
categories, where numeral scales may not have necessarily been assigned to the categories.
3
five categories and use the well-known poverty gap measure with the numeral scale of the
fourth category (i.e., the second best category) as the poverty line, then the former society
(A) reflects higher poverty than the latter (B).2 However, if we simply change the numeral
scales to (1, 5, 6, 7, 8), then the poverty ordering reverses.
Yet, the practice of using ordinal variables has been on the rise, in both developed and
developing countries alike, due to the recent surge of interest in studying deprivation in
non-monetary indicators, which are often ordinal in nature (e.g. access to basic facilities
of different quality).3 Moreover, there may be instances where ordinal categories of an
otherwise cardinally measurable variable could have more policy relevance. For example, in
some cases we might want to focus on ordered categories of income, nutritional status, or
years of education completed, rather than these indicators’ cardinal values.
How should poverty be meaningfully assessed with an ordinal variable? One straightforward
way may be to dichotomise the population into a group of deprived and a group of non-
deprived people, and then use the headcount ratio. However, this index is widely accused
of ignoring the depth of deprivations (Foster and Sen, 1997). In our illustration in Section
5, for instance, in Sylhet province of Bangladesh, between 2007 and 2011, the proportion of
2Let xi be the attainment of individual i and z be the poverty line. Then the poverty gap measure is the
average attainment shortfall from the poverty line as a proportion of the latter, attributing a zero shortfall
to non-poor people. That is, if N stands for the population size and q stands for the number of poor people,






(Foster et al., 2013).
3For example, as part of the first Sustainable Development Goals, the United Nations has set the target to
not only eradicate extreme monetary poverty, but also to reduce poverty in all its dimensions by 2030. See
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/poverty/ (accessed in April 2017).
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population with inadequate sanitation facilities went down from around 70% to nearly 63%;
whereas, during the same period, the proportion of people with the worst form of sanitation
deprivation (‘open defecation’) increased significantly, from around 2% to more than 12%
(see Table 3).
How can one reasonably capture the depth of deprivations for an ordinal variable? One
approach may be to use an aggregate poverty measure that is sensitive to depth of depriva-
tions. Alternatively one could simply either consider separately the relative frequencies of the
population experiencing deprivation within each ordered category, or equivalently compute
and compare headcount ratios (i.e. cumulative frequencies) for each possible poverty line.
The latter two approaches seem reasonable especially when the variable under consideration
has only a few deprivation categories and also when the required number of population-
comparisons is relatively small. Otherwise they may become cumbersome: even with only
four deprivation categories used in our illustration, an analysis of deprivation dynamics across
six provinces of Bangladesh over three years would involve comparing a staggering number
of 72 data points. Nonetheless, and in order to avoid a multitude of comparisons, one may
choose to prioritise and focus on those experiencing the most severe category of deprivation;
but this route comes at the expense of ignoring deprivations in other categories. Thus, in
this paper, we pursue the former approach of using an aggregate poverty measure that is
sensitive to all depths of deprivations within a variable.
The challenges associated with measuring well-being and inequality using an ordinal vari-
able in an axiomatic framework have received due attention during the last few decades
(e.g., Mendelson, 1987; Allison and Foster, 2004; Apouey, 2007; Abul Naga and Yalcin,
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2008; Zheng, 2011; Kobus and Milos, 2012; Permanyer and D’Ambrosio, 2015; Kobus, 2015;
Lazar and Silber, 2013; Yalonetzky, 2013; Gravel et al., 2015). Yet, when assessing poverty,
such efforts have not been sufficiently thorough. Bennett and Hatzimasoura (2011), in a
rare attempt, showed that indeed we can measure poverty with ordinal variables sensibly,
but implicitly ruled out entire classes of well-suited measures (as shown by Yalonetzky,
2012). Moreover, their assessment of depth-sensitivity was restricted to the ordinal version
of Pigou-Dalton transfers, thereby missing many other options including the burgeoning use
of Hammond transfers (e.g. see Ebert, 2007; Gravel et al., 2015; Cowell et al., 2017; Gravel
et al., 2018; Oui-Yang, 2018).4
Our paper contributes theoretically to the poverty measurement literature in three ways.
First, we axiomatically characterise a class of ordinal poverty measures under a minimal set
of desirable properties. Our class consists of measures that are weighted sums of population
proportions in deprivation categories, where these weights are referred to as ordering weights
because their values depend on the order of the categories. Our proposed measures are
sensitive to the depth of deprivations (unlike the headcount ratio), additively decomposable,
and bounded between zero and one.
Second, an adequately designed poverty measure should also ensure that policy makers have
proper incentive to prioritise those poorer among the poor in the design of poverty alleviation
4We refer to the unidimensional context here. The issue of ordinality has certainly been examined thoroughly
in the context of multidimensional poverty measurement (Alkire and Foster, 2011; Bossert et al., 2013;
Dhongde et al., 2016; Bosmans et al., 2017). However, even in the multidimensional context, ordinal
variables are often dichotomised in empirical applications (see, Alkire and Foster, 2011; Bossert et al., 2013;
Dhongde et al., 2016), thereby ignoring the depth of deprivations within indicators.
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policies so that the poorest are not left behind.5 In a novel attempt, we operationalise the
concept of precedence to poorer people by incorporating a new form of degree of poverty aver-
sion in the ordinal context, reflecting a prioritarian point of view rather than an egalitarian
one. Although grounded on prioritarianism, our new form of poverty aversion encompasses,
as limiting cases, both previous attempts at sensitising ordinal poverty indices to the depth
of deprivations (e.g., Bennett and Hatzimasoura, 2011; Yalonetzky, 2012) as well as current
burgeoning approaches to distributional sensitivity in ordinal frameworks based on Ham-
mond transfers (Hammond, 1976; Gravel et al., 2015). We define a range of properties based
on this new form of degree of poverty aversion and characterise the corresponding subclasses
of ordinal poverty measures. Within our framework, different degrees of poverty aversion
merely require setting different restrictions on the ordering weights, preserving the measures’
additive decomposability property.
Third, since each of our classes and subclasses admits a large number of poverty measures,
we develop related stochastic dominance conditions whose fulfilment guarantees the robust-
ness of poverty comparisons to alternative functional forms and measurement parameters.
Although some of these conditions turn out to be the ordinal-variable analogue of existing
dominance conditions for cardinal variables (Foster and Shorrocks, 1988b), several others are
novel methodological contributions to the literature on stochastic dominance with ordinal
variables (to the best of our knowledge).
To demonstrate the efficacy of our approach, we present an empirical illustration studying the
evolution of sanitation deprivation in Bangladesh using Demographic Health Survey datasets.
5Poverty measures may affect the incentives of policy makers during poverty alleviation (Zheng, 1997).
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Interestingly, our measures are able to discern the instances where the improvements in
overall sanitation deprivation did not necessarily include the poorest. Furthermore, we apply
the stochastic dominance conditions to test the robustness of poverty comparisons over time.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. After providing the notation, we present and then
axiomatically characterise the class of depth sensitive ordinal poverty measures in Section
2. Section 3 introduces the concept of precedence to poorer people, states the properties
related to the degrees of poverty aversion, and characterises the subclass of relevant poverty
indices. Then section 4 develops stochastic dominance conditions for the characterised class
and subclasses of poverty measures. Section 5 provides an empirical illustration analysing
sanitation deprivation in Bangladesh. Section 6 concludes.
2. A class of depth-sensitive poverty measures for an ordinal variable
Suppose, there is a social planner whose objective is to assess a hypothetical society’s poverty
in some well-being dimension, which is measured with a set of ordered categories. For
instance, self-reported health status may only include response categories, such as ‘good
health’, ‘fair health’, ‘poor health’, and ‘very poor health’. Similarly, there are also instances
where the ordinal categories of an otherwise cardinal variable, such as the years of schooling
completed, have more policy relevance.
Formally, suppose, there is a fixed set of S ∈ N \ {1} ordered categories c1, . . . , cS, where
N is the set of positive integers. The ordered categories are such that cs−1 ≻D cs for all
s = 2, . . . , S, where ≻D, which reads as “is more deprived than”, is a binary and transitive
relation whereby category cs−1 represents a worse-off situation than category cs. Thus, cS
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is the category reflecting least deprivation and c1 is the state reflecting highest deprivation.
Suppose, for example, a society’s well-being is assessed by the education dimension and the
observed ordered categories are ‘no education’, ‘primary education’, ‘secondary education’,
and ‘higher education’, such that ‘no education’ ≻D ‘primary education’ ≻D ‘secondary
education’ ≻D ‘higher education’. Then, c4 = ‘higher education’ and c1 = ‘no education’.
We denote the set of all S categories by C = {c1, c2, . . . , cS} and the set of all categories
excluding the category of least deprivation cS by C−S = C \ {cS}.
Each individual in society must experience only one of the S categories. We denote the
proportion of population experiencing category cs by ps for all s = 1, . . . , S. Clearly, ps ≥ 0
for all s and
∑S
s=1 ps = 1. The proportions of population in the society is summarised by
the vector: p = (p1, . . . , pS). Note that p is nothing but the discrete probability (or relative
frequency) distribution of the society’s population across the S categories. We denote the
set of all possible discrete probability distributions over S categories by P.
It is customary in poverty measurement to define a poverty threshold for identifying the poor
and the non-poor populations (Sen, 1976). Suppose, the social planner decides that category
ck for any 1 ≤ k < S and k ∈ N be the poverty threshold, so that people experiencing cat-
egories c1, . . . , ck are identified as poor ; whereas, people experiencing categories ck+1, . . . , cS
are identified as non-poor. We assume that at least one category reflects the absence of
poverty, as this restriction is both intrinsically reasonable and is required for stating certain
properties in Section 2.1. When k = 1, only category c1 reflects poverty and, in this case,
p1 is the proportion of the population identified as poor. For any ck ∈ C−S, we denote the




We define a poverty measure P (p, ck) as P : P ×C−S → R+. In words, a poverty measure
is a mapping from the set of probability distributions and the set of poverty thresholds to
the real line (note that the set of categories remains fixed).
2.1. Desirable properties
Now, as in many other areas of well-being measurement, the social planner needs to make
certain assumptions to perform interpersonal comparisons and meaningfully aggregate the
information available on the ordered deprivation categories in order to obtain a numerical
poverty measure. We present these assumptions in terms of properties or axioms. By relying
on discrete probability distributions, we already implicitly assume that poverty measures
satisfy anonymity and population principle. Anonymity requires that merely shuffling the
individual deprivation levels within a society should not alter the society’s poverty level;
whereas, the population principle requires that a mere duplication of the number of indi-
viduals experiencing each deprivation level within a society should not affect the society’s
poverty level. The population principle allows comparing poverty levels of societies with dif-
ferent population sizes. The social planner makes the following four additional assumptions.
The first property is ordinal monotonicity, which requires that if the living standard of a
poor person improves so that the person moves to a category of less deprivation, then societal
poverty should be lower. Formally, the property requires that if a poor person or a group
of poor people moves from a category ct reflecting poverty (i.e. t ≤ k) to a less deprived
category cu (i.e. ct ≻D cu), while the deprivation levels of everybody else in the society
remain unchanged, then poverty should fall. In terms of probability distributions, we set the
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requirement that if a fraction of the poor population is moved from category ct to category
cu, while the proportion of population in other categories remain unchanged, then poverty
should fall:
Ordinal Monotonicity (OMN) For any p,q ∈ P and for any ck ∈ C−S, if qt < pt for
some t ≤ k and t < u but ps = qs ∀s 6= {t, u}, then P (q, ck) < P (p, ck).
The second property is single-category deprivation. The property requires that whenever
there is only one category reflecting poverty (i.e. c1), then the poverty measure should be
equal to the headcount ratio H(p, c1) = p1. In other words, we assume that whenever there
is only one category reflecting poverty and the others reflect an absence of poverty, then
the headcount ratio becomes a sufficient statistic for the assessment of poverty. In fact,
in this situation, any functional transformation of the headcount ratio would not add any
meaningful information to the poverty assessment while being inferior in terms of intuitive
interpretation.
Single-Category Deprivation (SCD) For any p ∈ P and c1 ∈ C−S, P (p, c1) = p1.
The third property, focus, is essential for a poverty measure. It requires that, ceteris paribus,
a change in a non-poor person’s situation should not alter societal poverty evaluation as
long as the non-poor person remains in that status. In terms of probability distributions,
we set the requirement that as long as the proportion of poor population within each of the
k categories reflecting poverty remains unchanged, the level of poverty should be the same.
Note that the proportions of non-poor people may remain unchanged or may be different
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across the S − k categories not reflecting poverty, but this should not matter for poverty
evaluation.
Focus (FOC) For any p,q ∈ P and for any ck ∈ C−S, if qs = ps ∀s ≤ k, then P (q, ck) =
P (p, ck).
Finally, the social planner may be interested in exploring the relationship between the overall
poverty evaluation and the subgroup poverty evaluation, where population subgroups can
be geographical regions, ethnic groups, etc. Suppose society is partitioned into M ∈ N\{1}
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive population subgroups. We denote the pop-
ulation share in subgroup m by πm, such that πm ≥ 0 ∀m = 1, . . . ,M and
∑M
m=1 πm = 1.
We further denote the probability distribution across S categories within subgroup m by
pm = (pm1 , . . . , p
m




property, subgroup decomposability, requires overall societal poverty to be expressible as a
population-weighted average of subgroup poverty levels:
Subgroup Decomposability (SUD) For any M ∈ N/{1}, for any p ∈ P such that p =
∑M
m=1 πmp
m where (i) pm ∈ P ∀m = 1, . . . ,M , (ii) πm ≥ 0, and (iii)
∑M
m=1 πm = 1, and for
any ck ∈ C−S,






2.2. The class of poverty measures
The four properties outlined in Section 2.1 lead to the class of poverty measures that we
present in Theorem 2.1:
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Theorem 2.1 A poverty measure P satisfies properties OMN, SCD, FOC and SUD if and
only if





where ω1 = 1, ωs−1 > ωs > 0 for all s = 2, ..., k whenever k ≥ 2, and ωs = 0 for all s > k.
Proof. See Appendix A1.
We denote our class of poverty measures in Theorem 2.1 by P . A poverty measure in our
proposed class is a weighted sum of the population proportions in p, where the weights
(i.e. ωs’s) are non-negative for all categories, strictly positive for the deprived categories,
and unity for the most deprived category. We refer to weights ωs’s as ordering weights
and to ω = (ω1, . . . , ωS) as the ordering weighting vector.
6 The ordering weights increase
with deprived categories representing higher levels of deprivation. In practice, the ordering
weights may take various forms. For example, Bennett and Hatzimasoura (2011) make the
ordering weight for each deprivation category depend on the latter’s relative deprivation
rank. Category s is assigned an ordering weight equal to ωs = [(k − s + 1)/k]
θ for all s =
1, . . . , k and for some θ > 0. Thus, the least deprived category ck receives an ordering weight
of ωk = 1/k
θ; whereas, the most deprived category c1 receives an ordering weight of ω1 = 1.
6Kobus and Milos (2012, Theorem 3) also showed that a subgroup decomposable inequality measure for
ordinal variables that is sensitive to spreads away from the median is a monotonic transformation of the
weighted sum of population proportions. However, our ordering weights are significantly different both in
terms of their restrictions and interpretation vis-a-vis those involved in ordinal inequality measurement.
Moreover, our SCD property (see below) imposes a more stringent restriction on the permissible functional
transformations.
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The class of poverty measures in Equation 2.1 bears several policy-relevant features. First,
an appealing feature of the measures in our class is their simplicity. Second, unlike the
headcount ratio, the poverty measures in our class are sensitive to the depth of deprivations
as they assign larger weights to the more deprived categories. Thus, unlike the headcount
ratio, the proposed measures are sensitive to changes in deprivation status among the poor
even when they do not become non-poor owing to those changes. Third, the proposed
poverty measures are additively decomposable, which has two crucial policy implications.
One is that the society’s overall poverty measure may be expressed as a population-weighted
average of the population subgroups’ poverty measures, whenever the entire population is di-
vided into mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive population subgroups. The other is
that additively decomposable measures are convenient for cross-sectional and inter-temporal
econometric analysis as well as impact evaluation exercises. Fourth, the poverty measures
are conveniently normalised between zero and one. They are equal to zero only in a soci-
ety where nobody is poor; whereas, they are equal to one only whenever everybody in the
society experiences the worst possible deprivation category c1. Note that the normalisation
behaviour of our measures between zero and one, especially owing to the restrictions on ω’s,
is not an axiomatic assumption, but a logical conclusion from the foundational properties.
Fifth, the poverty measure boils down to the headcount ratio either when the poverty thresh-
old is represented by the most deprived category or whenever the underlying ordinal variable
has merely two categories.
Each poverty measure in class P may also have the following alternative interpretation: when
a policy maker only observes the population’s relative frequencies across ordered deprivation
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categories, then, based on the four assumptions, the policy maker assigns particular depri-
vation values in the form of ωs’s to these individuals. Each poverty measure in our proposed
class is an average of these assigned deprivation values.7
3. Precedence to the poorer among the poor
Poverty alleviation is a gradual process, where it is imperative to ensure that the poorest of
the poor are not left behind. Although all poverty measures in Equation (2.1) are sensitive to
the depth of deprivations, not all of them ensure that the poorest among the poor population
receive precedence over the less poor population during a poverty alleviation process. For
that purpose, we introduce an intuitive concept of giving precedence to poorer people in the
ordinal framework, in tune with the prioritarian view which holds that ‘benefiting people
matters more the worse off these people are’ (Parfit, 1997, p. 213).8 Furthermore, our notion
of precedence is presented in a general framework where the degree of precedence to poorer
people can vary between a minimum and a maximum.9
Let us introduce the concept using the example in Figure 1. Suppose, there are ten ordered
deprivation categories, where c1 is the most deprived category and c10 is the least deprived
7For an alternative version of the axiomatic characterisation of the measures in class P using anonymity and
population principle alongside the aforementioned properties, see Seth and Yalonetzky (2018).
8For an application of the prioritarian concept to the multidimensional context, see Bosmans et al. (2017).
For further discussion, comparing the prioritarian view with the egalitarian view see Fleurbaey (2015, p.
208).
9The concept is analogous to the degree of poverty or inequality aversion in the monetary poverty measure-
ment literature (Clark et al., 1981; Chakravarty, 1983; Foster et al., 1984), but not technically identical.
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category. Denoted by black circles, categories c1, . . . , c7 reflect poverty; whereas the other
three categories, denoted by gray circles, do not. Thus, c7 is the poverty threshold category,
which is highlighted by a large black circle in each distribution. The original distribution is
p, where each individual experiences one of the ten categories.
Figure 1: Precedence to poorer and the degree of precedence
p
c10 c9 c8 ck=7 c6 c5 c4 c3 c2 c1
p′
c10 c9 c8 ck=7 c6 c5 c4 c3 c2 c1
q
c10 c9 c8 ck=7 c6 c5 c4 c3 c2 c1
q′
c10 c9 c8 ck=7 c6 c5 c4 c3 c2 c1
q′′
c10 c9 c8 ck=7 c6 c5 c4 c3 c2 c1
Suppose the policy maker has the following two competing options: either (a) obtain distri-
bution p′ from p by assisting a fraction ǫ ∈ (0, 1) of poor people to move from category c1
to category c2 ; or (b) obtain distribution q from p by assisting a fraction ǫ of poor people
to move from category c2 to category c3. Which option should lead to a larger reduction in
poverty? One way of giving precedence to poorer people is to require that the move from
p to p′ should lead to a larger reduction in poverty than the move from p to q. It is a
minimal criterion for giving precedence to poorer people which we call minimal precedence
to poorer people (PRE-M). This property requires that, ceteris paribus, moving a fraction of
poorer people to an adjacent less deprived category leads to a larger reduction in poverty
than moving a fraction of less poor people to a respectively adjacent less deprived category.10
10We have defined only the strict versions of these properties, requiring poverty to be strictly lower in the
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The PRE-M property presents a minimal criterion for giving precedence to poorer people.
Yet what happens when the policy maker faces the alternatives of improving the situation of
a fraction of poorer people by one category and improving the situation of a similar fraction
of less poor people by several categories? To ensure that the policy maker still chooses to
improve the situation of the poorer people in these cases, we introduce the property of greatest
precedence to poorer people (PRE-G). This property requires that, ceteris paribus, moving a
fraction ǫ of poorer people to a less deprived category leads to a larger reduction in poverty
than moving a fraction ǫ of less poor people to any number of less deprived categories. Note
here that the improvement is not restricted to a particular number of adjacent categories.
For example, if PRE-G held, a move from p to p′ in Figure 1 should lead to a larger reduction
in poverty than even a move from p to q′′.
Conceptually, the PRE-G property is analogous to the notion of a Hammond transfer (Ham-
mond, 1976; Gravel et al., 2015), which essentially involves, simultaneously, an improvement
in a poor person’s situation and a deterioration of a less poor person’s situation, such that
their deprivation ranks are not reversed (in the case of poverty measurement). Also, an
ordinal poverty measure satisfying property PRE-G also satisfies property PRE-M, but the
reverse is not true. A policy maker supporting property PRE-G over property PRE-M should
be considered more poverty averse.
aftermath of specific pro-poorest distributional change. Consequently the ensuing results impose strict
inequality restrictions on weights. However, these strict restrictions may be relaxed with alternative
versions if the latter only require that poverty does not rise due to the same pro-poorest distributional
change.
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We could also consider intermediate forms of preference between the minimal (PRE-M) and
the greatest (PRE-G) forms of precedence. For example, instead of the greatest forms of
precedence, the policymaker may be satisfied with requiring, that, ceteris paribus, moving a
fraction ǫ of poorer people to an adjacent less deprived category leads to a larger reduction
in poverty than moving a fraction ǫ of less poor people to, say, two adjacent less deprived
categories. In such case, a move from p to p′ in Figure 1 should lead to a larger reduction
in poverty than a move from p to q′. We refer to this case as precedence to poorer people of
order two (PRE-2).
Likewise, we may obtain the policy maker’s preferred degree α of giving precedence to poorer
people. Thus, we introduce the general property of precedence to poorer people of order α,
which requires that, ceteris paribus, moving a fraction ǫ of poorer people to an adjacent
less deprived category leads to a larger reduction in poverty than moving a fraction ǫ of
less poor people up to an α (≥ 1) number of adjacent less deprived categories. A formal
general statement of the property, which includes PRE-M and PRE-G as limiting cases, is
the following:
Precedence to Poorer People of Order α (PRE-α) For any p,p′,q′ ∈ P, for any k ≥
2, for any ck ∈ C−S, and for some α ∈ N such that 1 ≤ α ≤ k−1, for some s < t ≤ k < S and
for some ǫ ∈ (0, 1), if (i) p′ is obtained from p such that p′s = ps−ǫ while p
′
u = pu ∀u 6= {s, s+
1}, and (ii) q′ is obtained from p such that q′t = pt− ǫ while q
′
u = pu ∀u 6= {t,min{t+α, S}},
then P (p′, ck) < P (q
′, ck).
Note that PRE-1 is essentially the PRE-M property. This is the case where the social planner
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is least poverty averse. As the value of α increases, the social planner’s poverty aversion rises.
In this framework, the social planner’s poverty aversion is highest at α = k − 1. We shall
subsequently show that PRE-α for α = k − 1 leads to the same subclass of ordinal poverty
measures as the PRE-G property. The PRE-α property imposes further restrictions on the
class of measures in Theorem 2.1. In Theorem 3.1, we present the subclass of measures Pα
that satisfy the general PRE-α property:
Theorem 3.1 For any k ≥ 2 and for some α ∈ N such that 1 ≤ α ≤ k − 1, a poverty
measure P ∈ P (Theorem 2.1) satisfies property PRE-α if and only if
a. ωs−1−ωs > ωs−ωs+α ∀s = 2, . . . , k−α and ωs−1 > 2ωs ∀s = k−α+1, . . . , k whenever
α ≤ k − 2.
b. ωs−1 > 2ωs ∀s = 2, . . . , k whenever α = k − 1.
Proof. See Appendix A2.
In a novel effort, Theorem 3.1 presents various subclasses of indices based on the degree of
poverty aversion α, which we denote as Pα. In order to give precedence to poorer people,
additional restrictions must be imposed on the ordering weights. Corollary 3.1 presents the
limiting case of P1, featuring the least poverty averse social planner:
Corollary 3.1 For any k ≥ 2, a poverty measure P ∈ P (Theorem 2.1) satisfies property
PRE-M (i.e. PRE-1) if and only if ωs−1 − ωs > ωs − ωs+1 ∀s = 2, ..., k − 1 and ωk−1 > 2ωk.
Proof. The result follows directly from Theorem 3.1 by setting α = 1.
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To give precedence to poorer people in the spirit of property PRE-M, the ordering weights
must be such that the difference ωs−1−ωs is larger than the subsequent difference ωs−ωs+1,
in addition to the restrictions imposed by Theorem 2.1. Suppose, we summarise the ordering
weights by: ω = (ω1, . . . , ωS). Let us consider an example involving five categories and two
ordering weight vectors: ω′ = (1, 0.8, 0.5, 0, 0) and ω′′ = (1, 0.5, 0.2, 0, 0), where k = 3.
The ordering weights in ω′ fulfill all properties presented in Theorem 2.1, but the largest
reduction in poverty is obtained whenever a poor person moves from the least poor category
to the adjacent non-poor category. By contrast, ordering weights in ω′′ require that the
largest reduction in poverty be obtained whenever a poor person moves from the poorest
category to the adjacent second poorest category. Thus, unlike the ordering weights in ω′,
the ordering weights in ω′′ make sure that poorer people receive precedence.
Next we present the subclass of poverty measures satisfying property PRE-G, i.e. PG:
Proposition 3.1 For any k ≥ 2, a poverty measure P ∈ P (Theorem 2.1) satisfies property
PRE-G if and only if ωs−1 > 2ωs ∀s = 2, . . . , k.
Proof. See Appendix A3.
The additional restriction on the ordering weights in Proposition 3.1 effectively prioritises
the improvement in a poorer person’s situation over improvement of any extent in a less poor
person’s situation. Let us consider an example involving five categories and two ordering
weight vectors: ω′ = (1, 0.6, 0.3, 0.1, 0) and ω′′ = (1, 0.48, 0.23, 0.1, 0), where k = 4. Clearly,
both sets of weights in ω′ and ω′′ satisfy the restriction in Corollary 3.1 that ωs−1 − ωs >
ωs − ωs+1 for all s = 2, . . . , k. However, the ordering weights in ω
′ do not satisfy the
20
restriction in Proposition 3.1, since ω′1 < 2ω
′
2; whereas the ordering weights in ω
′′ do satisfy
the restriction in Proposition 3.1 as ω′′s−1 > 2ω
′′
s for all s = 2, . . . , k.
An interesting feature of the set of weights satisfying property PRE-G is that, for k ≥ 3,
any deprivation category up to the third least detrimental deprivation category (i.e. k − 2),
should receive a weight greater than the sum of weights assigned to all categories reflecting
lesser deprivation, i.e. ωs >
∑k
ℓ=s+1 ωℓ for all s = 1, . . . , k − 2.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that, remarkably, the subclasses PG (Proposition 3.1) and
Pk−1 (Theorem 3.1 when α = k − 1) are identical; even though the distributional changes
involved in the PRE-α property are only specific cases of those involved in PRE-G. Besides
being of interest in itself, this perfect overlap between the subclasses of indices will prove
useful in Section 4 because by deriving the dominance conditions for the subclasses Pα, we
will also obtain the relevant dominance conditions for subclass PG.
11
4. Poverty dominance conditions
Stochastic dominance conditions come in handy whenever we want to ascertain the robust-
ness of a poverty ranking of distributions to alternative reasonable comparison criteria, e.g.
11Noteworthy is the expected resemblance between the weighting restriction identified in Proposition 3.1
and that in the class of welfare functions for ordinal variables derived in Gravel et al. (2015, Lemma 2).
The latter characterises welfare functions that increase both when someone moves to a better category
(so-called increments) and in the aftermath of Hammond transfers. Setting αk = 0 and changing the
inequality sign in Gravel et al. (2015, Lemma 2) to interpret their α functions (not to be confused with
our α parameter) as ordering weights for poverty measurement yields the weight restriction in Proposition
3.1.
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selection of poverty lines, choice of different functional forms, etc. (Atkinson, 1987; Foster
and Shorrocks, 1988b; Fields, 2001). Moreover, often stochastic dominance conditions reduce
an intractable problem of probing the robustness of a comparison across an infinite domain
of alternative criteria to a finite set of distributional tests (Levy, 2006). In Sections 2 and 3,
we introduced the class of poverty measures P and its subclasses Pα. The main parameters
for these measures are the set of ordering weights {ω1, . . . , ωk} and the poverty threshold
category ck. It is thus natural to inquiry into the circumstances under which poverty com-
parisons based on ordinal variables are robust to alternative ordering weights as well as
alternative poverty threshold categories. In this section, first we introduce the first-order
dominance conditions relevant to P , followed by the second-order dominance conditions for
Pα for all α.
4.1. Poverty dominance conditions for all measures in P
Theorem 4.1 provides poverty dominance conditions that are relevant to all measures in class
P , but for a given poverty threshold category ck ∈ C−S:
Theorem 4.1 For any p,q ∈ P and a given ck ∈ C−S, P (p, ck) < P (q, ck) ∀P ∈ P if and
only if
∑s
ℓ=1(pℓ − qℓ) ≤ 0 ∀s ≤ k with at least one strict inequality.
Proof. See Appendix A4.
Once a particular poverty threshold category ck ∈ C−S is chosen, Theorem 4.1 states that
poverty in distribution p ∈ P is strictly lower than that in distribution q ∈ P for all measures
in P if and only if all partial sums of the probabilities up to category ck in p are nowhere
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higher and at least once strictly lower than the respective partial sums in q. The result in
Theorem 4.1 may also be presented in terms of the headcount ratio H(p, ck) as follows: the
poverty comparison for a particular poverty threshold category ck is robust to all poverty
measures in P if and only if H(p, cs) ≤ H(q, cs) for all s ≤ k and H(p, cs) < H(q, cs) for at
least one s ≤ k.
Corollary 4.1 extends the first-order dominance condition obtained in Theorem 4.1 to any
measure P ∈ P and all poverty threshold categories in C−S:
Corollary 4.1 For any p,q ∈ P and all ck ∈ C−S, P (p, ck) < P (q, ck) for any P ∈ P and
for all ck ∈ C−S if and only if
∑s
ℓ=1(pℓ − qℓ) ≤ 0 ∀s = 2, . . . , S − 1 and p1 < q1.
Proof. The sufficiency part is straightforward and follows from Equation A1. We prove
the necessary condition as follows. First, consider k = 1. Then, P (p, c1) < P (q, c1) only if




ℓ=1 qℓ ∀s = 2, . . . , S − 1 follows
from Theorem 4.1.
Interestingly, in terms of headcount ratios, poverty in distribution p is lower than poverty in
distribution q for any P ∈ P and for all possible poverty threshold categories if and only if
H(p, cs) ≤ H(q, cs) for all s ≤ k and H(p, c1) < H(q, c1). Thus, the results in Theorem 4.1
and Corollary 4.1 are the ordinal versions of the headcount-ratio orderings for continuous
variables derived by Foster and Shorrocks (1988b).
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4.2. Poverty dominance conditions for all measures in Pα
We now present poverty dominance conditions that are relevant to all measures in subclass
Pα for some α ∈ [1, k − 1]. We refer to the poverty dominance for a particular value of
α as PRE-α dominance. For the presentation of our results in this section, we define the
following additional notation. First, by ⌊b⌋ for any b ∈ R++, we denote the largest possible
non-negative integer that is not greater than b (for example, if b = 5.2 then ⌊b⌋ = 5).
Secondly, for some k ≥ 2, we denote the rth ordinal weighting vector by ωr = (ωr1, . . . , ω
r
S)
for all r = 1, . . . , k. In Theorem 4.2, we show that one needs to evaluate poverty orderings
across two distributions at k distinct ordinal weighting vectors to test PRE-α dominance
and we explicitly derive the weights ωrs for all s = 1, . . . , S and for all r = 1, . . . , k.
Theorem 4.2 presents the PRE-α dominance conditions for a given poverty threshold category
ck ∈ C−S and k ≥ 2:
Theorem 4.2 For any p,q ∈ P, for some k ≥ 2, and for some α ∈ [1, k−1] ⊆ N, P (p, ck) <






















































0 for s > r and r = 1, . . . , k
1 for s = 1 and r = 1, . . . , k












































Proof. See Appendix A5.
For a given ck ∈ C−S and for a given α ∈ [1, k − 1], according to Theorem 4.2, poverty in
distribution p is lower than that in distribution q for all P ∈ Pα (i.e., p PRE-α dominates








sqs ∀r = 1, . . . , k with at least one strict inequality,
where the values for all ωrs ’s are determined by Equation 4.1. The first condition within
Equation 4.1 requires that ωrs = 0 whenever s > r; whereas, the second condition requires,






3) = (1, 0, 0). The third condition within Equation 4.1 requires that for values of
r ranging between 2 and α + 1 for a given value of α, ωrs = 2
1−s for all s = 1, . . . , r, due to
the restriction ωs−1 > 2ωs ∀s = 2, . . . , r whenever α = r − 1 or r = α + 1 as in part b. of
Theorem 3.1. The fourth and fifth conditions within Equation 4.1 follow from the second
condition and the first condition, respectively, of part a. of Theorem 3.1.
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For any chosen value of α, k different conditions must be tested for concluding dominance
in a poverty comparison.12 Let us provide an example with S = 6 and k = 5. In this
case, α may take four different values: α = 1, 2, 3, 4. Moreover, since S > k, ωk6 = 0 for








sqs, with one strict inequality,
must be satisfied for the five ordinal weighting vectors ωr corresponding to r = 1, . . . , 5,
as presented in Table 1. Each column of the table presents the five ordering weighting
vectors for a given value of α; whereas, the kth row of the table reports the kth ordering
weights vector for different values of α. The corresponding values of r̄ are also reported
where they are relevant. For instance, if α = 2, then poverty comparisons should be checked







































Table 1: The ordering weighting vectors for conducting dominance tests for different α’s
when S = 6 and k = 5
α = 1 α = 2 α = 3 α = 4
ω























































































































































































We also provide simplified versions of the dominance conditions presented in Theorem 4.2
12This approach to dominance testing is analogous to that used in robustness tests for composite indices
with respect to alternative weights (see, Seth and McGillivray, 2018; Foster et al., 2012).
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for the two extreme cases of minimal precedence (i.e. α = 1) as in Corollary 3.1 and of
greatest precedence (i.e. α = k − 1) as in Proposition 3.1. Whenever α = 1, we must test k
restrictions on the linear combinations of partial sums of probabilities as in Corollary 4.2:
Corollary 4.2 For any p,q ∈ P and for some k ≥ 2, P (p, ck) < P (q, ck) ∀P ∈ P1 for




j=1(pj − qj) ≤ 0 ∀s ≤ k with at least one strict
inequality.
Proof. See Appendix A6.
The dominance condition presented in Corollary 4.2 is the ordinal version of the “P2” poverty
ordering as in Foster and Shorrocks (1988b). Corollary 4.3, on the other hand, presents the
dominance conditions for greatest precedence (i.e. α = k − 1):
Corollary 4.3 For any p,q ∈ P and for some k ≥ 2, P (p, ck) < P (q, ck) ∀P ∈ PG for a
given ck ∈ C−S if and only if
∑s
ℓ=1 2
1−ℓ(pℓ−qℓ) ≤ 0 ∀s ≤ k with at least one strict inequality.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify from Theorem 4.2 by setting α = k − 1.
So far, we have presented the dominance conditions for a given ck. Finally, Corollary 4.4
provides the second-order dominance conditions relevant to any measure P ∈ Pα for some
α ∈ [1, k − 1], but for all ck ∈ C−S such that k ≥ 2:
Corollary 4.4 For any p,q ∈ P, for some k ≥ 2, and for some α ∈ [1, k − 1] ⊆ N,
P (p, ck) < P (q, ck) ∀P ∈ Pα for all ck ∈ C−S if and only if (a) p1 ≤ q1 and 2p1+p2 ≤ 2q1+q2




s(ps − qs) ≤ 0 ∀r = 3, . . . , S − 1, where
ω
r = (ωr1, . . . , ω
r
S) ∀r = 3, . . . , S − 1 are obtained from Equation 4.1 of Theorem 4.2.
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Proof. First consider the case when k = 2. Then from Equation 4.1 of Theorem 4.2, it
follows that p1 ≤ q1 and 2p1 + p2 ≤ 2q1 + q2, with at least one strict inequality. Therefore,
conditional (a) is both necessary and sufficient. Whenever, k ≥ 3, part (b) follows from
Theorem 4.2 by setting k = S − 1.
In summary, the robustness of poverty comparisons for various classes and subclasses of
ordinal measures introduced in Sections 2.1 and 3 can be assessed with a battery of dominance
tests based on the theorems and corollaries presented in this section.
5. Empirical illustration: Sanitation deprivation in Bangladesh
We now present an empirical illustration in order to showcase the efficacy of our proposed
measurement method. In the current global development context, both the United Nations
through the Sustainable Development Goals13 and the World Bank through their Report
of the Commission on Global Poverty (World Bank, 2017) have acknowledged the need for
assessing, monitoring, and alleviating poverty in multiple dimensions besides the monetary
dimension. In practice, most non-income dimensions are assessed by ordinal variables. In
this section, we show how our measurement tools may be applied to analyse inter-temporal
sanitation deprivation in Bangladesh.
For our analysis, we use the nationally representative Demographic Health Survey (DHS)
datasets of Bangladesh for the years 2007, 2011, and 2014. We compute the point estimates
and standard errors incorporating the sampling weights as well as respecting the survey
13Available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs.
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design.14 Excluding the non-usual residents, we were able to consider the information on
50,215 individuals from 10,398 households in the 2007 survey, 79,483 individuals from 17,139
households in the 2011 survey, and 77,680 individuals from 17,299 households in the 2014
survey.
Table 2: The five ordered categories of access to sanitation facilities
Category Description
Open defecation Human faeces disposed of in fields, forests, bushes, open bodies of
water, beaches or other open spaces or disposed of with solid waste
Unimproved Pit latrines without a slab or platform, hanging latrines and bucket
latrines
Limited Sanitation facilities of an otherwise acceptable type shared between
two or more households
Basic unsafe A basic sanitation facility which is not shared with other households,
but excreta are not disposed safely, such as flushed but not disposed
to piped sewer system, septic tank or pit latrine
Improved Sanitation facility which is not shared with other households and
where excreta are safely disposed in situ or treated off-site and in-
cludes flush/pour flush to piped sewer system, septic tank or pit la-
trine, ventilated improved pit latrine, composting toilet or pit latrine
with a slab
One target of the United Nations’ sixth Sustainable Development Goal (whose aim is to
‘ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all’) is ‘by 2030,
[to] achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open
defecation.’ In order to hit the target, the Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) of the
World Health Organisation and the UNICEF proposes using ‘a service ladder approach to
benchmark and track progress across countries at different stages of development”, building
on the existing datasets.15 We pursue this service ladder approach and apply our ordinal
14See NIPORT et al. (2009, 2013, 2016) for details about the survey design.
15The JMP document titled WASH Post-2015: Proposed indicators for drinking water, sanitation and
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poverty measures to study the improvement in sanitation deprivation in Bangladesh. We
classify households’ access to sanitation in the five ordered categories presented in Table 2.
The five categories are ordered as ‘open defecation’ ≻D ‘unimproved’ ≻D ‘limited’ ≻D ‘basic
unsafe’ ≻D ‘improved’. We consider all persons living in a household deprived in access to
sanitation if the household experiences any category other than ‘improved’.
Table 3: Change in population distribution across sanitation categories in Bangladesh
Bangladesh Dhaka Rajshahi Sylhet
2007 2011 2014 2007 2011 2014 2007 2011 2014 2007 2011 2014
Open defecation 7.5 4.2 3.3 7.5 4.0 2.2 13.8 3.9 3.2 2.1 12.5 9.4
(0.8) (0.3) (0.5) (1.4) (0.7) (0.8) (2.3) (0.8) (0.9) (0.4) (1.5) (1.3)
Unimproved 47.1 38.3 25.7 44.3 35.9 22.6 45.3 36.4 28.3 57.2 34.3 23.0
(1.1) (0.9) (1.3) (1.9) (1.7) (2.8) (2.6) (3.1) (2.7) (3.3) (2.0) (2.6)
Limited 13.4 16.7 20.9 14.4 18.0 26.1 14.7 20.7 20.2 10.1 17.7 22.3
(0.5) (0.6) (0.8) (1.1) (1.5) (2.0) (1.2) (1.4) (1.3) (1.9) (0.9) (1.8)
Basic 3.5 4.3 2.3 8.6 10.5 5.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.3
(0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (1.0) (1.6) (1.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2)
Improved 28.5 36.6 47.8 25.2 31.6 43.7 26.0 38.8 48.0 30.1 35.4 45.0
(1.0) (0.9) (1.1) (1.9) (1.9) (2.5) (1.9) (2.3) (2.3) (2.3) (1.9) (1.7)
Sources: Authors’ own computations. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 3 shows how the estimated population shares in different deprivation categories have
evolved over time in Bangladesh. Clearly, the estimated percentage in the ‘improved’ cate-
gory has gradually increased (statistically significantly) from 28.5% in 2007 to 36.6% in 2011
to 47.8% in 2014. Thus, the proportion of the population in deprived categories has gone
down over the same period. Changes within the deprived categories are however mixed.
Although the estimated population shares in the two most deprived categories (‘open defe-
cation’ and ‘unimproved’) have decreased (statistically significantly) systematically between
hygiene was accessed in November 2019 at https://www.who.int/water sanitation health/monitoring/
coverage/wash-post-2015-rev.pdf.
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2007 and 2014, the population shares in the other two deprivation categories have not.
Table 4: Change in sanitation deprivation by ordinal poverty measures in Bangladesh and
its divisions
H PI PM PG
2007 2011 2014 2007 2011 2014 2007 2011 2014 2007 2011 2014
Barisal 66.1 60.5 46.8 47.7 44.0 32.6 35.0 32.6 23.4 25.2 23.5 16.7
(2.7) (2.1) (3.3) (1.9) (1.7) (2.9) (1.4) (1.4) (2.4) (1.1) (1.1) (1.8)
Chittagong 67.1 59.2 44.9 47.0 38.9 29.2 34.8 27.3 20.2 26.2 19.6 14.9
(2.9) (2.1) (3.1) (2.8) (1.7) (2.9) (2.7) (1.5) (2.7) (2.6) (1.2) (2.5)
Dhaka 74.8 68.4 56.3 50.1 42.6 33.5 36.6 29.4 21.8 27.8 21.6 15.4
(1.9) (1.9) (2.5) (1.7) (1.3) (1.8) (1.6) (1.1) (1.6) (1.4) (1.0) (1.3)
Khulna 69.0 61.4 50.3 48.9 41.8 33.0 35.7 29.4 22.7 25.9 20.9 16.1
(1.8) (1.6) (2.3) (1.4) (1.2) (1.7) (1.1) (1.0) (1.4) (1.0) (0.7) (1.0)
Rajshahi 74.0 61.2 52.0 55.2 41.6 34.7 43.0 29.6 24.2 34.1 21.6 17.6
(1.9) (2.3) (2.3) (1.8) (1.9) (1.8) (1.9) (1.6) (1.5) (1.9) (1.3) (1.3)
Sylhet 69.9 64.6 55.0 50.1 47.1 37.9 36.8 36.2 27.9 26.5 28.9 21.9
(2.3) (1.9) (1.7) (1.9) (1.6) (1.7) (1.5) (1.4) (1.6) (1.1) (1.4) (1.4)
Bangladesh 71.5 63.4 52.2 50.4 42.3 33.5 37.5 30.1 23.1 28.5 22.2 16.8
(1.0) (0.9) (1.1) (0.9) (0.7) (0.9) (0.9) (0.6) (0.8) (0.8) (0.5) (0.7)
Sources: Authors’ own computations. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Has this estimated reduction pattern been replicated within all divisions? Table 3 also
presents the changes in the discrete probability distributions of three divisions: Dhaka,
Rajshahi, and Sylhet.16 The estimated population shares in the ‘improved’ category have
increased (statistically significantly) gradually in all three regions (Table 3), and so the shares
of deprived population have gone down. We need, however, to point out two crucial aspects.
First, let us compare the reduction patterns in Dhaka and Rajshahi. The population share in
16A new division called Rangpur was formed in 2010, which was a part of the Rajshahi Division. The new
division did not exist during the 2007 DHS, so we had to combine this division with the Rajshahi division
in the 2011 and 2014 DHS in order to preserve comparability over time. Likewise, our selected surveys
were not affected by the carving out of northern Dhaka to form the Mymesingh division in 2015.
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the ‘improved’ category is higher in Rajshahi in 2011 and 2014 and statistically indistinguish-
able in 2007, implying that sanitation deprivation in Dhaka is never lower than sanitation
deprivation in Rajshahi. However, the estimated population shares in the two most deprived
categories (‘open defecation’ and ‘unimproved’) are higher in Rajshahi than in Dhaka in 2007
and 2014 and statistically indistinguishable in 2011. Second, like Dhaka and Rajshahi in Ta-
ble 3, sanitation deprivation in Sylhet has also improved gradually. However, the estimated
population share in the poorest category (‘open defecation’) is significantly higher in 2011
and in 2014 than in 2007. A simple headcount measure, which only captures the proportion
of the overall deprived population, would always overlook these substantial differences.
Table 4 presents four different poverty measures for Bangladesh and for its six divisions
(as per the pre-2010 administrative map). We assume the poverty threshold category to
be ‘basic unsafe’. The first poverty measure is the headcount ratio (H), which, in this
context, is the population share experiencing any one of the four deprivation categories. The
second measure is PI , such that PI ∈ P \ {Pα} for α ≥ 1, and is defined by the ordering
weights ωI = (1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, 0). The third measure is PM ∈ P1 \ {Pα} for α ≥ 2 with
ordering weights ωM = (1, 0.752, 0.52, 0.252, 0), i.e. respecting the restrictions in Corollary
3.1, but not respecting, for instance, the restrictions in Proposition 3.1 or the restrictions
in Theorem 3.1 for α ≥ 2; whereas, the fourth measure is PG ∈ PG with ordering weights
ω
G = (1, 0.4, 0.15, 0.05, 0), i.e. respecting the restrictions in Proposition 3.1. Note that
measures PM and PG give precedence to those who are in the poorer categories. All four
measures lie between zero and one, but we have multiplied them by one hundred so that
they lie between zero (lowest deprivation) and 100 (highest deprivation).
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Comparisons of these measures provide useful insights, especially into the two crucial aspects
that we have presented in Table 3. The headcount ratio estimate in Dhaka is statistically
indistinguishable from the headcount ratio estimate in Rajshahi for 2007, despite deprivation
in the two poorest categories being higher in Rajshahi. However, this crucial aspect is
captured by the latter three measures, which show statistically significantly higher poverty
estimates in Rajshahi than in Dhaka. Similarly, the headcount ratio estimate is higher in
Dhaka than in Rajshahi for 2011, but the difference vanishes when poverty is assessed by the
other three ordinal measures. Meanwhile, Table 4 also shows that, without accounting for
the depth of deprivations, the headcount ratio ranks Dhaka as poorer than Sylhet in 2011.
However, this ranking reverses as soon as we use deprivation-sensitive measures from the
class P .
Since most of the information in Table 4 points to experiences of poverty reduction, we
further conduct pair-wise dominance tests in order to verify whether the comparisons over
time are robust to all measures in class P , and in sub-classes P1 and PG. Note, in this case,
that S = 5 and k = 4. The dominance test for P is based on Theorem 4.1, the dominance
test for P1 is based on Corollary 4.2 (i.e. α = 1), and the dominance test for PG is based
on Corollary 4.3 (i.e. α = k − 1 = 3 ). Checking pair-wise dominance for P1 requires
comparing poverty levels at the following four extreme points: (1, 0, 0, 0, 0), (1, 1
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, 0). Meanwhile, checking pair-wise dominance for PG requires
comparing poverty levels at the following four extreme points: (1, 0, 0, 0, 0), (1, 1
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Table 5 presents the pair-wise dominance tests over time for Bangladesh and its divisions.
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Table 5: Pair-wise dominance tests for changes in poverty over time in Bangladesh and its
divisions
2007–2011 2011–2014
P P1 PG P P1 PG
Barisal No No No Yes Yes Yes
Chittagong Yes** Yes** Yes** No No No
Dhaka Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes**
Khulna Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Rajshahi Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes Yes Yes
Sylhet No No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
Bangladesh Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes* Yes* Yes*
Sources: Authors’ own computations. A “Yes” implies reduction of the poverty levels within each
region over time evaluated at the four extreme weights; a “No” implies otherwise. The levels of
statistical significance for the dominance tests are: *** for 1%, ** for 5% and * for 10%.
Each cell of the table reports whether a reduction or increase in poverty within each region
over time in Table 4 is robust (or not) to alternative ordering weighting vectors within the
class (i.e., P) and subclasses (i.e., P1 and P2) to which the ordering weighting vectors used
in Table 4 belong.17 For example, it is evident from Table 4 that, according to PM , poverty
in Bangladesh has fallen from 37.5 points in 2007 to 30.1 points in 2011. So we could ask: is
this reduction between 2007 and 2011 robust to all P ∈ P1? The corresponding dominance
test reported in Table 5 shows that the reduction is certainly robust with 1% significance
level. If a cell in Table 5 reports either “No” or “Yes”, but without appropriate statistical
significance level, then we conclude that the relevant comparison in Table 4 is not robust.
17We implemented a standard intersection-union test (IUT) whose alternative hypothesis is that poverty
levels at the four extreme points are jointly lower in year-region “A” (e.g. Bangladesh in 2011) vis-à-vis
“B” (e.g. Bangladesh in 2007). We reject the null (i.e. at least one poverty level in “A” is equal or higher
than in “B”) in favour of this alternative only if every poverty level is lower in “A” than in “B” with a
given significance level α. As explained by Berger (1997, p. 226), the IUT’s overall significance level is
also α and no correction for multiple comparisons (e.g. Bonferroni, etc.) is required.
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For instance, poverty reduction in Dhaka has been robust for the whole class P at the 5%
level of significance throughout both time periods (2007-2011 and 2011-2014); whereas, the
poverty reduction for neither Barisal nor Chittagong for the period 2011-2014 reported in
Table 4 can be claimed to be robust for any of the three (sub)classes of indices considered.
6. Concluding remarks
There is little doubt that poverty is a multidimensional concept and the current global devel-
opment agenda correctly seeks to ‘reduce poverty in all its dimensions’. To meet this target,
it is indeed important to assess poverty from a multidimensional perspective. However, one
should not discount the potential interest in evaluating the impact of a targeted program
in reducing deprivation in a single dimension such as educational or health outcomes and
access to public services, which may often be assessed by an ordinal variable with multiple
ordered deprivation categories. The frequently used headcount ratio, in this case, is ineffec-
tive as it overlooks the depth of deprivations, i.e. any changes within the ordered deprivation
categories.
Our paper has thus posed the question: ‘How should we assess poverty when variables are
ordinal?’ Implicitly, the companion question is ‘Can we meaningfully assess poverty beyond
the headcount ratio when we have an ordinal variable?’ Drawing on six reasonable axiomatic
properties, our answer is: ‘Poverty can be measured with ordinal variables through weighted
averages of the discrete probabilities corresponding to the ordered categories.’ We refer to
these weights as ordering weights, which need to satisfy a specific set of restrictions in order to
ensure the social poverty indices fulfil these key properties. Our axiomatically characterised
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class of social poverty indices has certain desirable features, such as additive decomposability
and being bounded between zero (when none experiences any deprivation) and one (when
everyone experiences the most deprived category).
In contrast to previous attempts in the literature on poverty measurement with ordinal
variables, we have gone fruitfully further in the direction of operationalising different concepts
of ‘precedence to the poorer people among the poor’, which ensures that the policymaker
has an incentive to assist the poorer over the less poor. We have shown that it is possible
to devise reasonable poverty measures that prioritise welfare improvements among the most
deprived when variables are ordinal. We have axiomatically characterised a set of subclasses
of ordinal poverty measures based on different notions of precedence to those poorer among
the poor. Each subclass is defined by an additional restriction on the admissible ordering
weights. The precedence-sensitive measures have proven useful in the illustration pertaining
to sanitation deprivation in Bangladesh by highlighting those provinces where the overall
headcount improvement did not come about through reductions in the proportion of the
population in the most deprived categories.
Since several poverty measures are admissible within each characterised class and subclass, we
have also developed stochastic dominance conditions for each subclass of poverty measures.
Their fulfilment guarantees that all measures within a given class (or subclass) rank the same
pair of distributions robustly. While some of these conditions represent the ordinal-variable
analog of existing conditions for continuous variables in the poverty dominance literature
(Foster and Shorrocks, 1988b); others are, to the best of our knowledge, themselves a novel
methodological contribution to the literature on stochastic dominance with ordinal variables.
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There has been a recent surge in the literature on multidimensional poverty measurement,
especially within the counting framework. In this framework, however, it is still a usual
practice to dichotomise deprivations within each dimension when using existing counting
measures, ignoring the depth of deprivation across ordered categories. Future research could
focus on the development of counting measures that incorporate both the depth of depriva-
tions within dimensions and notions of precedence to the poorest among the poor.
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Appendices
Appendix A1. Proof of Theorem 2.1
It is straightforward to check that each poverty measure in Equation 2.1 satisfies the four
properties: OMN, SCD, FOC and SUD.
We now prove the necessary part, namely, if a poverty measure satisfies these four properties,
then it takes the functional form in Equation 2.1. First, we define S ∈ N \ {1} basis vectors:
es = (es1, . . . , e
s
S) ∈ P ∀s = 1, . . . , S, such that e
s
s = 1 ∀s and e
t
s = 0 ∀s 6= t. For a given
ck ∈ C−S, denote P (e
s, ck) = ωs for some ωs ∈ R+ for every s = 1, . . . , S.
Next, suppose a society with probability distribution p = (p1, . . . , pS) ∈ P is divided into
M = S mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive sub-groups, such that the probability
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distribution of each subgroup is ps = (ps1, . . . , p
s
S) = e
s for every s = 1, . . . , S (= M). As
each subgroup contains the population in each category, naturally, the population share of
each subgroup is πs = ps for every s = 1, . . . , S (= M). Then, by SUD:















Now, consider any two p,q ∈ P, such that ps = 1 for some s ≤ k and qs′ = 1 for some s
′ > s.
Naturally, pt = qt = 0 for all t 6= {s, s
′}. Clearly, by OMN, we have P (q, ck) < P (p, ck).
Combined with Equation A1, we then obtain:
ωs′ < ωs. (A2)
The relationship in Equation A2 holds for any s, such that s ≤ k and s < s′. In other words,
ωs−1 > ωs > ωs′ for all s = 2, ..., k and even for any s
′ > k, whenever k ≥ 2. When S = 2,
then k = 1 and so ω1 > ω2.
We next use property SCD. Suppose, k = 1. Then, property SCD leads to P (p, ck) = p1
and Equation A1 yields




psωs = p1. (A3)
Note, by definition, that 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1 and so 0 ≤ P (p, ck) ≤ 1. Consider some p ∈ P, such
that p1 = 1 and ps = 0 for all s 6= 1. Clearly, from Equation A3, ω1 = 1. Moreover, from
Equation A2, it follows that 1 > ωs > ωs′ for all s = 2, . . . , k and for any s
′ > k whenever
k ≥ 2.
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In order to complete the proof, we need to show that ωs = 0 for all s > k. For this
purpose, consider some p,q ∈ P, such that pt = qu = 1 for some t > u > k. Certainly,
ps = qs = 0 ∀s ≤ k. By property FOC, we then require P (p, ck) = P (q, ck). Thus,
from Equation A1, we obtain P (p, ck) = ωt = ωu = P (q, ck) for t > u > k. Since,
ps = qs = 0 ∀s ≤ k, it follows that p1 = q1 = 0. Consider k = 1. Then, by property SCD,
we must have P (p, ck) = P (q, ck) = 0. Hence, it must be the case that ωs = 0 for all s > k,
which completes our proof.
Appendix A2. Proof of Theorem 3.1
The sufficiency part is straightforward. We prove the necessity part as follows.
Suppose k ≥ 2 and α ∈ N such that 1 ≤ α ≤ k − 1. Now, suppose, p′ and q′ are obtained
from p ∈ P as follows. Consider some s′ < t ≤ k < S. Now, p′ is obtained from p, such
that p′s′ = ps′ − ǫ while p
′
u = pu ∀u 6= {s
′, s′ +1}. Naturally, p′s′+1 = ps′+1 + ǫ. Similarly, q
′ is
obtained from p, such that q′t = pt− ǫ while q
′
u = pu ∀u 6= {t, t
′} for some t′ = min{t+α, S}.
Naturally, again, q′t′ = pt′ + ǫ.
By property PRE-α, we know that
P (p′, ck) < P (q
′, ck). (A1)
Combining Equation 2.1 and Equation A1, we get
ωs′+1 − ωs′ − ωt′ + ωt < 0.
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Substituting t = s′ + 1 = s for any s = 2, . . . , k, we obtain
ωs−1 − ωs > ωs − ωt′ . (A2)
First, suppose t′ = s+ α ≤ k < S or s ≤ k − α. Then, ωt′ = ωs+α > 0 by Theorem 2.1 and
Equation A2 can be expressed as ωs−1 − ωs > ωs − ωs+α for all s = 2, . . . , k − α. Second,
suppose t′ = min{s + α, S} > k or s > k − α. We know that ωs = 0 for all s > k by
Theorem 2.1 and so Equation A2 can be expressed as ωs−1 − ωs > ωs or ωs−1 > 2ωs for all
s = k − α + 1, . . . , k. This completes the proof.
Appendix A3. Proof of Proposition 3.1
Let us first prove the sufficiency part. Suppose k ≥ 2. We already know from Theorem
2.1 that ωs−1 > ωs > 0 ∀s = 2, . . . , k and ωs = 0 ∀s > k. Suppose additionally that
ωs−1 > 2ωs ∀s = 2, . . . , k. Alternatively, ωs−1 − ωs > ωs ∀s = 2, . . . , k.
For any p,p′,q′ ∈ P, for any ck ∈ C−S and for some ǫ ∈ (0, 1), let k ≥ t ≥ v+α and suppose
p′ is obtained from p, such that p′v = pv−ǫ and p
′
v+α = pv+α+ǫ, while p
′
u = pu ∀u 6= {v, v+α};
and q′ is obtained from p, such that q′t = pt − ǫ and q
′
t+β = pt+β + ǫ for some β ∈ N, while
q′u = pu ∀u 6= {t, t+ β}.
With the help of Equation 2.1, we get:
P (p′, ck)− P (q
′, ck)] = ǫ[ωv+α − ωv − ωt+β + ωt] = ǫ[(ωt − ωt+β)− (ωv − ωv+α)]. (A1)
By assumption of the sufficiency part: ωs−1 − ωs > ωs ∀s = 2, . . . , k. Combining this
assumption with the weight restrictions from Theorem 2.1 we can easily deduce that (ωv −
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ωv+α) > (ωv − ωv+1) > ωv+1 > ωv+α. Hence, (ωv − ωv+α) > ωv+α. Since v + α ≤ t ≤ k and
ωs−1 > ωs > 0 ∀s = 2, . . . , k, it also follows that ωv+α ≥ (ωt − ωt+β). Hence, (ωv − ωv+α) >
(ωt − ωt+β) and P (p
′, ck) < P (q
′, ck).
Next we prove the necessity part starting with Equation A1. By property PRE-G, we know
that P (p′, ck) < P (q
′, ck). Thus,
ωv − ωv+α > ωt − ωt+β. (A2)
Now the inequality in Equation A2 must hold for any situation in which t ≥ v+α, including
the comparison of the minimum possible improvement for the poorer person, given by ωv −
ωv+1 (i.e. with α = 1), against the maximum possible improvement for the less poor person,
given by ωt − ωt+β with t = v + 1 and t + β > k. Inserting these values into Equation A2,
bearing in mind that ωt+β = 0 when t+ β > k, yields
ωv − ωv+1 > ωv+1.
Substituting v = s− 1 for any s = 2, . . . , k yields ωs−1 − ωs > ωs. Hence, ωs−1 > 2ωs for all
s = 2, . . . , k.
Appendix A4. Proof of Theorem 4.1
We denote the difference operator by ∆ and use the following handy definitions: For some
p,p′ ∈ P, define ∆Pk ≡ P (p, ck)− P (p
′, ck), ∆ps ≡ ps − p
′
s, and ∆Fs ≡
∑s
ℓ=1 ∆pℓ.
We first prove the sufficiency part. From Theorem 2.1, we know that ωs = 0 for all s > k.




Using summation by parts, also known as Abel’s lemma (Guenther and Lee, 1988) or formula





[ωs − ωs+1]∆Fs +∆Fkωk. (A1)
We already know from Theorem 2.1 that ωk > 0 and ωs − ωs+1 > 0 ∀s = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Therefore, clearly from Equation A1, the condition that ∆Fs ≤ 0 ∀s ≤ k and ∆Fs < 0 for
at least one s ≤ k is sufficient to ensure that ∆Pk < 0 ∀P ∈ P and for a given ck ∈ C−S.
We next prove the necessity part by contradiction. Consider the situation, where ∆Ft > 0
for some t ≤ k, ∆Fs ≤ 0 for all s ≤ k but s 6= t, and ∆Fs < 0 for some s ≤ k but s 6= t. For
a sufficiently large value of ωt − ωt+1 in Equation A1, it may always be possible to find that
∆Pk > 0. Or, consider the situation ∆Fs = 0 for all s ≤ k. In this case, ∆Pk = 0. Hence,
the necessary condition requires both ∆Fs ≤ 0 for all s ≤ k and ∆Fs < 0 for some s ≤ k.
This completes the proof.
Appendix A5. Proof of Theorem 4.2
Consider some k ≥ 2 and some α ∈ [1, k − 1] ⊆ N. Let Ωkα be the set of all S-dimensional































(ω1, . . . , ωS) | ω1 = 1; ωs−1 > 2ωs − ωs+α ∀s = 2, . . . , k − α; ωs−1 > 2ωs > 0
∀s = k − α + 1, . . . , k; and ωs = 0 ∀s > k whenever α ≤ k − 2
(ω1, . . . , ωS) | ω1 = 1; ωs−1 > 2ωs > 0 ∀s = 2, . . . , k; and ωs = 0 ∀s > k
whenever α = k − 1
.
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(ω1, . . . , ωS) | ω1 = 1; ωs−1 ≥ 2ωs − ωs+α ∀s = 2, . . . , k − α; ωs−1 ≥ 2ωs ≥ 0
∀s = k − α + 1, . . . , k; and ωs = 0 ∀s > k for α ≤ k − 2
(ω1, . . . , ωS) | ω1 = 1; ωs−1 ≥ 2ωs ≥ 0 ∀s = 2, . . . , k; and ωs = 0 ∀s > k
for α = k − 1
.
For given values of k and α, Ω̄kα is bounded by a set of linear constraints and it is a convex
hull of k extreme points or extreme ordering weighting vector, denoted by ω̄1, . . . , ω̄k. For
the rth extreme point ω̄r, where r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, maximum feasible positive weights are
assigned to the first r elements and minimum feasible weights are assigned to the rest of
the elements (where feasibility refers to satisfying the linear constraints defining the set Ω̄kα),
such that ωs = ω̄
r
s > 0 for all s = 1, . . . , r and ωs = ω̄
r
s = 0 for all s = r + 1, . . . , S.
18 Any






r=1 θr = 1 and θr ≥ 0 for all r = 1, . . . , k.
The restrictions on the aforementioned θr’s may be verified as follows. Since, ω1 = 1 and



























ωs − 2ωs+1 + ωs+α+1 ∀s = 1, . . . , k − α− 1 and ωs − 2ωs+1
∀s = k − α, . . . , S − 1 whenever α ≤ k − 2
ωs − 2ωs+1 ∀s = 1, . . . , S − 1 whenever α = k − 1
.






s for all s and ω̄
r






















































where the third component on the right hand side of Equation A1 exists only when s+α+1 ≤
k. Given that the extreme weighting vectors satisfy the equality restrictions in Ω̄kα, the second
component and the third component (whenever in existence) on the right-hand side must be
equal to zero. Hence, us = θsω̄
s
s for all s, which is unrelated to the restrictions of Theorem
3.1. Given that us ≥ 0 for all s = 1, . . . , k by the definition of Ω̄
k
α and also ω̄
s
s > 0 (i.e.,
s = r) for all s = 1, . . . , k by the definition of extreme weighting vectors, then, substituting
r = s, it must be the case that θr ≥ 0 for all r = 1, . . . , k.
The primary difference between Ωkα and Ω̄
k
α is that the elements of Ω̄
k
α satisfy the non-strict
versions of the inequality restrictions prescribed by Theorem 3.1. Clearly, Ωkα ⊂ Ω̄
k
α and
therefore any ω ∈ Ωkα is also a convex combination of ω̄






r=1 θr = 1. However, the strict inequality constraints in Ω
k
α require that us > 0 for
all s = 1, . . . , k, which implies that θr > 0 for all r = 1, . . . , k for Ω
k
α.
For any p ∈ P, let us denote the poverty level evaluated at some ω as P (p, ck;ω) and, given
additive decomposability, we must have P (p, ck;ω) =
∑k




1 and θr > 0 for all r = 1, . . . , k. Clearly, for some p,q ∈ P, if P (p, ck; ω̄
r) ≤ P (q, ck; ω̄
r)
for all r = 1, . . . , k, with one strict inequality, then it follows directly that P (p, ck;ω) <
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P (q, ck;ω) for any ω ∈ Ω
k
α or, equivalently, for all P ∈ Pα for a given ck. This proves
sufficiency.
In order to prove necessity, suppose P (p, ck; ω̄
r) > P (q, ck; ω̄
r) for some r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Then, for a sufficiently large value of θr (i.e., for θr → 1), it is always possible to have
P (p, ck;ω) > P (q, ck;ω). Furthermore, in case P (p, ck; ω̄
r) = P (q, ck; ω̄
r) for all r =
1, . . . , k, then certainly P (p, ck;ω) = P (q, ck;ω) for all ω ∈ Ω
k
α. Hence, the conditions,
P (p, ck; ω̄
r) ≤ P (q, ck; ω̄
r) for all r = 1, . . . , k, with one strict inequality, are also necessary.
Finally, the solutions for the k extreme points are obtained as follows. By Theorem 2.1,
ω̄r1 = 1 for all r = 1, . . . , k. From above, we already know that ω̄
r
s = 0 for all s = r+1, . . . , S
and for every r. Therefore, for every r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ω̄rs = 0 for all s > r. We also know that
ω̄rs > 0 for all s ≤ r. Now, for any α and for every r ∈ {2, . . . , k}, we obtain the following



























r . There are (r − 1) unknowns: ω̄
r
2, . . . , ω̄
r
r ,




s for all s = 2, . . . , r and for
all r = 1, . . . , k in Equation 4.1. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Appendix A6. Proof of Corollary 4.2
We use the difference operators defined in Appendix A4. Summing by parts the first com-


















We know from Corollary 3.1 that [ωs − ωs+1]− [ωs+1 − ωs+2] > 0 ∀s = 1, ..., k− 1. Likewise,
by Theorem 2.1, ωk > 0. Therefore
∑s
ℓ=1 ∆Fℓ ≤ 0 for all s = 1, ..., k with at least one strict
inequality is sufficient to ensure that, for any p,q ∈ P, P (p, ck) < P (q, ck) ∀P ∈ P1. On the
contrary, suppose
∑s
ℓ=1 ∆Fℓ > 0 for some s ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Now, note that there is no further
restriction on whether any of the weight functions in Equation A1 is strictly greater than
the others. Then, attaching a sufficiently large weight to this component (i.e.
∑s
ℓ=1 ∆Fℓ > 0
for some s ∈ {1, . . . , k}) may result in P (p, ck) > P (q, ck) for some P ∈ P1. Hence, the
conditions are also jointly necessary, which completes the proof.
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